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Abstract
Although some firms use dynamic pricing to respond to demand fluctuations,
other firms claim that fairness concerns prevent them from raising prices during
periods when demand exceeds capacity. This paper explores conditions in which
fairness concerns can or cannot cause shortages. In our model, a firm announces
a price policy that states its prices during high and low demand, and customers
must travel to a venue to learn the current price. We show that the interaction
of fairness concerns with travel costs can cause the firm to set stable prices,
which leads to shortages during high demand. However, if the firm is able to
inform customers about the current price before they incur any travel costs,
then dynamic pricing with no shortages is optimal even with strong fairness
concerns.
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Introduction

Managers often claim that fairness concerns compel them to maintain stable prices,
even during periods when their demand exceeds their capacity. Until recently, Disney
theme parks had ticket prices that stayed constant throughout the year, partly
because executives “thought it would be unfair to charge different prices for what
some would see as the same product” (Economist 2016). Disney did not raise ticket
prices even during times of year when their parks consistently reached maximum
capacity, so they had to close their gates to new customers (Martin 2014). Similarly,
the commissioner of the National Basketball Association once stated that NBA teams
did not set higher ticket prices for more popular games than for less popular games
because doing so “raises questions about the fairness of your pricing” (Lefton and
Lombardo 2003). Teams did not raise prices even for games they knew would have
ticket sell-outs that left many fans unable to purchase (Rovell 2001).
However, some organizations that previously maintained constant prices have
begun to vary prices over time. Disneyland has adopted a new policy in which
ticket prices are higher during the most popular days to visit the park (Fritz 2016).
Likewise, NBA teams and other professional sports teams have started setting higher
ticket prices for more popular games than for less popular games (Drayer et al. 2012;
Shapiro et al. 2016).
Academic researchers, consultants, and business journalists continue to debate
how fairness concerns should affect firms’ price policies. Previous academic research
has shown that many customers think it is unfair for a firm to raise prices during
a temporary spike in demand (Kahneman et al. 1986; Bolton et al. 2003). These
papers imply firms should maintain stable prices during demand spikes, even during
shortages. On the other hand, the basic theory of supply and demand shows that,
when demand exceeds capacity, price increases lead to higher profits and more efficient
2
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allocation of resources (Feeney 2014; Weiner 2014; Mohammed 2015). Furthermore,
customers who consider these price increases unfair can simply choose not to purchase
during peak demand. Such arguments imply that fairness concerns should not lead
to shortages.
The current paper develops a formal model to derive conditions in which fairness
concerns can or cannot cause shortages. In our model, a firm sets a price policy that
specifies its prices during high and low demand. In each period, customers in the
market are uncertain whether demand is currently high or low. For example, news
stories reported that many customers did not anticipate Disneyland’s high demand
on Christmas Day until they had driven to the park (Martin 2014). Because they do
not know the current demand level, customers must incur the cost of traveling to a
venue (where the product is sold) to learn the current price. Under variable pricing,
customers with fairness concerns anticipate that, if they travel then buy when prices
are high, they will experience disutility both from the direct effect of a higher price
and also from the unfairness of knowing they are paying more than customers who
traveled when demand was low. To avoid imposing this disutility on its customers,
a profit-maximizing firm may want to set stable prices, even if there are shortages
during high demand.
However, if the firm can reveal the current price to customers before they travel,
then customers with fairness concerns and low valuations can decide to travel only
during low demand, when prices are low. In this case, the firm uses dynamic pricing
with no shortages, even in the presence of strong fairness concerns. Thus, shortages
occur in the model only if the firm does not have a low-cost way to reveal the current
price to customers before they incur travel costs.
Our results provide one possible explanation for why some industries have adopted
variable pricing, whereas others have not. As the Internet reduces communication

3
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costs, some firms can easily provide advance price information to customers. For
example, Disneyland’s website now states one-day admissions prices for each day of
the current calendar year, with each day designated as “value,” “regular,” or “peak”
pricing.1 If such communications allow customers to learn the current price before
they drive to the park, then our results imply the firm should use variable pricing,
which prevents shortages.
On the other hand, some firms may not be able to provide customers with advance
price information if they used variable pricing. For example, because weather forecasts
are imprecise, a firm’s predictions of its own future price changes based on weather
conditions would also be imprecise. Therefore, our results imply retail stores might
want to maintain constant prices for umbrellas even though many stores sell out
of umbrellas when it rains (Rogers 2016).2 Similarly, because predicting the future
temperature and informing customers about a vending machine’s future prices may
be costly or impractical, our results help explain why Coke abandoned a technology
that would raise prices in its vending machine during high temperatures (Leonhardt
2005).3
Section 2 discusses related literature.

Section 3 presents the formal model.

Section 4 presents conclusions. The appendix contains formal proofs of all results.
1

Prices are available at https://disneyland.disney.go.com/tickets/. As another example, Uber
sometimes warns customers about periods with unusually high surge prices. On New Year’s Eve of
2016, Uber released this statement: “On this busy night, fares will be the highest between midnight
and 3am as people head home for the night” (Haydu 2016).
2
We interviewed a Disneyland executive who said that stores in their theme park often have
stockouts of umbrellas when it rains. He said they would not consider raising the price of umbrellas
when it is raining because of the potential backlash from customers who would consider such price
increases unfair.
3
The CEO of the Coca Cola Company once proposed vending machines that would automatically
raise the price of drinks when the temperature was hot. After complaints that this price policy would
represent “gouging” and “exploitation” of customers, the company canceled its plans to vary prices
based on temperature (Leonhardt 2005).

4
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2

Related Literature

Kahneman et al. (1986) make an informal argument that fairness concerns can lead
to shortages. They present survey results showing that most people would consider
it unfair, for example, for a firm to raise the price of snow shovels after a snowstorm.
The authors then hypothesize that, if firms engage in such price “gouging,” customers
punish the firm by reducing their purchases during subsequent periods that have lower
demand levels. Rotemberg (2005) develops a formal model in which customers punish
a firm if it engages in unfair pricing. Our paper demonstrates a different mechanism
for how fairness concerns can cause shortages. Fairness concerns in our model do
not involve desire for punishment or enforcement of social norms. Rather, customers
derive disutility from paying a higher price than others, and raising prices during peak
demand does not lead to any punishment in subsequent periods if customers know
in advance the firm’s price and demand level in each period. Customer uncertainty
about demand is a key element of how fairness concerns cause shortages in our model.
Lab experiments have shown that people may reject offers they perceive as unfair,
even if accepting the offer would increase their own monetary payoff (e.g., Hoffman
et al. 1994; Camerer and Thaler 1995). Field experiments have also shown that
customers who pay a high price and then observe others paying a lower price for
the same item are less likely to purchase from the company in the future, which
is consistent with these customers deriving disutility from paying a higher price
than others do (Anderson and Simester 2010). Motivated by such experimental
findings, Fehr and Schmidt (1999) develop a model of fairness in which each player’s
utility depends on his own payoff and the difference between this payoff and that of
other players. We use this utility model as the basis for incorporating fairness into
our model. Previous research has used a similar approach to incorporate fairness
into models of channel pricing (Cui et al. 2007), third-degree price discrimination
5
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(Englmaier et al. 2012; Okada 2014), pricing with customer recognition (Li and Jain
2016), pricing with private information about the firm’s costs (Guo 2015; Guo and
Jiang 2016), and pay-as-you-wish pricing (Chen et al. 2017). These earlier models do
not involve shortages or rationing in equilibrium. The new aspect of our paper is to
develop a formal model of how fairness concerns in the style of the Fehr and Schmidt
(1999) model can lead to rationing.
Under alternative assumptions, our model could generate shortages even without
fairness concerns. In particular, if we assumed there was a negative correlation
between a customer’s valuation and the change in his probability of being in the
market during high versus low demand periods, as in the model by Gilbert and
Klemperer (2000), then rationing could occur in equilibrium even without fairness
concerns. However, in the case of entertainment attractions like Disneyland, this
alternative explanation for rationing would require that tourists (who are in the
market primarily during peak demand periods) have a lower per-visit valuation than
local customers (who are in the market throughout the year), which is the opposite
of what we would normally expect. Our results show that fairness concerns provide
a different explanation for shortages, which does not depend on average valuation of
customers in the market decreasing during peak demand.
Previous theoretical research has shown firms may want to restrict capacity to
induce high valuation customers to buy during an early period with high prices and
thus avoid possible regret or disappointment from being unable to purchase later
(Liu and Shum 2013; Nasiry and Popescu 2012; Ozer and Zheng 2016). In these
models, rationing increases profits by creating uncertainty about purchase availability
for customers who wait to purchase at lower prices. Our paper provides a different
explanation for rationing. The firm in our model does not intentionally restrict its
capacity, and in fact, its profits increase as its capacity grows.

6
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Previous research has studied other reasons firms might set prices low enough to
require rationing their product. Rationing can occur if customers desire a product
more as a result of other customers consuming it (Becker 1991), if price adjustment
is costly (Levy et al. 1997), if a firm sets prices before learning demand for the period
(Su 2010). We demonstrate a new explanation for rationing, in particular, that it
can result from the interaction of customers’ uncertainty about demand and their
disutility from paying a higher price than others.
Wernerfelt (1994) develops a model in which price advertising induces customers
to incur the cost of inspecting a good. Similarly, in the current paper, the firm
announces a price policy to induce customers to incur the cost of travel. We show
how the optimal price policy (the choice of fixed versus variable pricing) depends on
the firm’s ability to inform customers with fairness concerns about the current price
before they incur travel costs.

3

Model

A monopolist can sell a product over an infinite number of periods, denoted by
t ∈ {1, 2, 3, . . .}. There is a mass D of potential customers with product valuations
uniformly distributed on [0, V ]. Each customer can purchase at most one unit in each
period, but can purchase in multiple different time periods. For analytical simplicity,
we assume that a customer’s purchase decision in one period does not affect his
valuation in subsequent periods. In contrast with dynamic pricing models in which
each customer purchases at most once (e.g., Nasiry and Popescu 2012), in our model
the firm seeks to maximizes profits from customers who make repeat purchases.
Each period has probability H of having high demand and (1 − H) of having
low demand, with the demand state independent across time periods. During high

7
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demand periods, a mass DH of the customers are available potentially to purchase
the product, and during low demand periods, a mass DL of the customers are
potentially available, where 0 < DL < DH ≤ D. For example, in each period,
some potential customers consider traveling to a vacation destination, whereas others
do not consider traveling to the destination (at any price) because they are busy with
other professional or personal obligations during that period. The choice of which
particular customers are in the market is independent across periods. There is a
proportional shift in the demand curve between high and low demand periods, that
is, there is no correlation between a customer’s valuation and the difference in his
likelihood of being in the market during high versus low demand.
Before the fist period, the firm announces a price policy that specifies unit prices
PH and PL it will charge during high demand and low demand periods, respectively,
where PH ≥ 0 and PL ≥ 0. Customers learn the firm’s price policy as a result of its
announcement. The basic insights of our model would still hold if customers learned
the price policy in other ways, for example, by reading news stories about the firm’s
dynamic price policy or by learning about this policy through personal experience
with their first few purchases. We initially assume the firm’s announcement is binding,
but we relax this assumption in section 3.3 and allow the announcement to be “cheap
talk,” and we derive conditions in which reputation effects compel the firm not to
deviate from its announced price policy.
After learning the firm’s price policy, in each period customers in the market
decide whether to incur cost c to travel to the venue where the product is sold to
learn the price for the current period, where 0 ≤ c < V . We later present a model
extension in section 3.4 that separates search and travel costs, so customers can search
for the current price before deciding whether to travel to the entertainment venue (for
example) or travel directly to the venue without searching first.

8
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Customers who travel to the venue then have the option to attempt to purchase
the product. The firm has a capacity constraint, so that in each period it can serve
at most K customers, where K > 0. If the number of customers who attempt to buy
exceeds capacity, then K of the customers are randomly selected to buy the product,
with all of the customers who attempt to buy having equal chances of being chosen.
Customers maximize their expected utility, with fairness concerns modeled in
a similar manner to the model of customer recognition by Li and Jain (2016). A
customer with valuation vi derives utility 0 if he does not travel to the venue, −c if
he travels and then decides not to purchase or makes a failed purchase attempt, and
vi −c−Pt −α(Pt −min(PL , PH )) if he purchases at any price Pt ≥ min(PL , PH ), where
α ≥ 0.4 The constant α reflects the disutility customers experience from paying a
higher price than others. One interpretation is this term reflects inequity aversion,
as in Fehr and Schmidt (1999). Another interpretation is customers who pay higher
prices than others suffer transaction disutility, as in Thaler (1985). The particular
functional form of this disutility is not essential for our findings. The important aspect
of this utility function is that price dispersion across periods reduces the utility of
customers who purchase in the high price condition.5
All production costs are normalized to zero, and the firm maximizes expected
discounted profits, with discount factor δ, where 0 < δ < 1.6
4

In our base model in section 3.1, price is always equal to one of the firm’s announced prices,
PL or PH , but the model extension in section 3.3 allows the firm to set different prices. We assume
customers derive utility vi − c − Pt from purchasing at price Pt < min(PL , PH ), although the firm
never has an incentive to deviate to a price below its minimum announced price.
5
The model of inequity aversion by Fehr and Schmidt (1999) implies that price dispersion would
also decrease the utility of customers in the low price condition who feel bad about inequity, whereas
the model of transaction utility by Thaler (1985) implies price dispersion would increase the utility
of those in the low price condition who feel good about receiving a favorable deal. However, both
models imply that the effect on customers in the high price condition is greater in absolute value
than the effect on those in the low price condition. In the interest of parsimony, and similar to the
model by Li and Jain (2016), we include only the effect on those in the high price condition.
6
In our base model in section 3.1, the discount factor does not affect equilibrium outcomes, but
in the extension in section 3.3, the firm’s discount factor helps determine whether its non-binding
price policy announcement is sustainable in equilibrium.

9
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To summarize, the firm first announces a price policy that specifies PL and PH ,
and in each period t the game timing is as follows:
1. Nature determines the demand state and the set of customers who are available
in the market. The firm automatically sets its price according to its announced
policy for the given demand state. Customers do not observe the current
demand state or price.
2. Customers who are in the market decide whether to incur the cost to travel to
the venue where the product is sold.
3. Customers who traveled to the venue learn the current price and have the option
to make a purchase attempt. If there is excess demand, then the product is
rationed. Payoffs for the period are realized.

3.1

Results

We first characterize customer behavior in response to any given price policy, and we
then characterize the profit-maximizing price policy for the firm.
To decide whether to travel to the venue, customers need to form beliefs about
the success probability for purchase attempts in each demand state, which depends
on the number of other customers who attempt to purchase. In each period, the
number of customers who attempt to purchase depends on the number of customers
available in the market (based on the high or low demand state), the fraction of those
customers in the market who then travel to the venue, and the fraction of customers
at the venue who then attempt to purchase. Customers form beliefs about each of
these variables based on rational expectations.
A customer in the market does not initially observe the demand state, but he
knows that he himself is in the market, which provides some information about de10
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mand. In particular, given prior probability H of high demand, a potential customer
who observes that he is in the market updates his belief about the probability of the
b according to Bayes’ rule:
current state having high demand to H,

b=
H

HDH
HDH + (1 − H)DL

(1)

For each demand state, customers form beliefs about the probability they will
be able to purchase. Customers also anticipate the utility they would derive from
purchasing given their valuation, the price, and possible disutility from unfairness
because of price variation. A customer with valuation vi will incur the cost to travel
if the following condition holds:7

b H max[vi − PH − α(PH − PL ), 0] + (1 − H)S
b L max[vi − PL , 0] ≥ c
HS

(2)

where SH and SL are the probability that a purchase attempt succeeds during high
and low demand, respectively. The left side of this equation reflects the expected
value to a customer with valuation vi of traveling to the venue.
In equilibrium, customers’ beliefs about success probabilities in each demand state
must be accurate given the set of customers who travel. Let v ∗ denote the lowest
valuation for which customers travel. We will refer to the customer with valuation v ∗
as the “marginal customer.” Demand in period t depends on the maximum of v ∗ and
the period’s price Pt , and if prices are not the same in all periods, it is possible for Pt
to be either above or below v ∗ . We can compute the success probabilities as follows:

KV
,1
SH (v ) = min
DH (V − max[(PH + α(PH − PL )), v ∗ ])
∗



7

(3)

We have stated this condition, and the following derivations of customer behavior, for the case
in which PH ≥ PL , which is true in equilibrium. In principle, our model also allows PL > PH ,
in which case an analogous condition must be satisfied for a customer with valuation vi to learn
demand.

11
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KV
SL (v ) = min
,1
DL (V − max[PL , v ∗ ])
∗



(4)

These equations represent success probabilities based on the number of people who
travel to the venue and make purchase attempts for a given value of v ∗ . Note that SH
and SL are continuous and weakly increasing functions of v ∗ , and both functions are
equal to one for any v ∗ sufficiently close to V . Intuitively, if fewer customers travel,
purchase attempts have a higher success probability.
If we insert vi = v ∗ into (2), we see that, in equilibrium, the marginal customer’s
valuation must satisfy:

b H (v ∗ ) max[v ∗ − PH − α(PH − PL ), 0] + (1 − H)S
b L (v ∗ ) max[v ∗ − PL , 0] = c
HS

(5)

The left side of (5) is strictly less than c for v ∗ = 0, continuous and weakly increasing
in v ∗ , and strictly greater than c for v ∗ = V if prices are low enough to induce
some customers to travel.8 Thus, for any given price policy, equilibrium customer
behavior is characterized by a unique value of v ∗ that solves (5), for which customers
with valuations exceeding v ∗ travel and then attempt to purchase if their valuation
exceeds the period’s price. When this equation holds, customers’ travel behavior is
based on correct beliefs about their success probability given the probability of high
demand and given the set of customers who travel in each demand state.
For a given price policy (PH , PL ), we can compute v ∗ as described above, and the
firm’s quantity sold during each high-demand period, QH , quantity sold during each
low-demand period, QL , and expected profits in each period, E[πt ], are as follows:
DH (V − max[PH + α(PH − PL )), v ∗ ])
,K
QH = min
V




8

(6)

Profit-maximizing prices must induce customers with the highest valuation to travel if the success
probability is one. In particular, prices must satisfy (2) for vi = V , SH = 1, and SL = 1, or no
customers would travel.

12
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DL (V − max[PL , v ∗ ])
QL = min
,K
V




E[πt ] = HPH QH + (1 − H)PL QL

(7)
(8)

In general, there are three types of price policies the firm can use: variable
prices (PH > PL ) with no rationing; constant prices (PH = PL ) with no rationing;
and constant prices (PH = PL ) with prices low enough to require rationing during
high demand.9 Because the marginal customer’s valuation, v ∗ , depends on fairness
disutility during peak demand, and also depends on the purchase success probabilities
(which depend on v ∗ in a nonlinear manner), it is not generally possible to derive
simple close-form expressions for profits under each type of policy. We instead derive
sufficient conditions that ensure rationing either does or does not occur in equilibrium.
We first show that, if customers do not have fairness concerns, then the firm sets
prices such that all purchase attempts are successful, and rationing does not occur.
Proposition 1. If customers do not have fairness concerns (α = 0), there is no
rationing in equilibrium.
Intuitively, if customers do not have fairness concerns, then reducing PH until
shortages occur is not the most profitable way to encourage customers with a given
valuation to travel. It would be more profitable to reduce PL to provide the same
expected utility to the marginal customer, that is, to generate the same value of v ∗ .
We next show that, if customers have no travel costs, then in this case as well, no
rationing occurs in equilibrium.
Proposition 2. If customers have no travel costs (c = 0), there is no rationing in
equilibrium.
9

Another feasible strategy would be to set prices that vary across periods, with rationing during
high demand. However, we show in the proof of Lemma 2 that this strategy is always dominated by
one of the other strategies.

13
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The intuition for this result is the following. If c = 0, customers travel as long
as their valuation exceeds PL . Therefore, the firm can raise PH until no rationing
is necessary during high-demand periods, without affecting its profits during lowdemand periods. In this case, strong fairness concerns do reduce the equilibrium
price and profits during high demand, but the firm would still not want to set its
high-demand price low enough to generate shortages.
We will now derive sufficient conditions to ensure rationing does occur in equilibrium. We focus on the following parameter region, which we show ensures the
capacity constraint binds during high demand but not during low demand:
Condition 1.

DL (V −c)
2V

<K<

DH (V −c)
2V

Given this condition, we show that the firm sets prices such that the equilibrium value
of v ∗ lies in [v ∗ , v ∗ ], as given below. The lower end of this range is the same as the
lowest valuation that the firm would serve if it did not face a capacity constraint:10

v∗ =

V +c
2

(9)

The upper end is the lowest valuation served such that the capacity constraint holds
with equality during high demand:


K
v =V 1−
DH
∗

(10)

Lemma 1. If Condition 1 holds, then in equilibrium, the minimum valuation for
which customers travel to the venue is given by v ∗ ∈ [v ∗ , v ∗ ].
We next show the following condition ensures that, in order to induce customers
to travel for any value of v ∗ ∈ [v ∗ , v ∗ ], it is more profitable for the firm to set constant
10

If there were not a capacity constraint, the firm would set prices PH = PL =
with valuations greater than V 2+c would always travel and purchase.

V −c
2 ,

14
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and customers

prices rather than prices that vary across periods.
Condition 2. v ∗ − v ∗ <

αc
b
1−H

Intuitively, the firm has two possible ways to induce the marginal customer with
valuation v ∗ to travel. It can set flat prices (PH = PL ) so that the marginal customer
always attempts to purchase, or it can set variable prices (PH > PL ) so that the
marginal customer always travels but purchases only during low demand. The firm’s
choice between these two price policies involves a tradeoff between two types of
inefficiency. Constant prices result in some low valuation customers buying during
peak demand even when some higher valuation customers cannot due to rationing,
whereas variable prices result in customer disutility from unfair prices during peak
demand. If Condition 2 holds, then fairness concerns are strong enough, and the
required reduction in PL to induce low-valuation customers to travel if the firm uses
variable pricing is also great enough, that flat prices are more profitable than variable
prices over the entire range of possible values of v ∗ .
Lemma 2. If Conditions 1 and 2 hold, then in equilibrium, the firm sets the same
price during high and low demand, that is, PH = PL .
Finally, we show the following condition ensures that, if the firm does sets constant
prices, it sets prices low enough to induce customers with valuations strictly less than
v ∗ to make purchase attempts, so that rationing occurs during high demand.


Condition 3. V 1 −

2K
DH



>

c
b
1−H

+

HKV
(1−H)DL

As H approaches 0, Condition 3 becomes equivalent to V 1 −

2K
DH



> c, which

is guaranteed to hold under Condition 1. On the other hand, as H approaches 1,
Condition 3 is guaranteed not to hold. Thus, one can interpret Condition 3 as ensuring
that the probability (H) of high demand is low enough that a firm setting constant
15
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prices chooses a relatively low price, despite the inefficiency caused by rationing during
the high demand periods.11
Proposition 3. If the firm’s capacity constraint binds during high demand
(Condition 1 holds), the interaction of fairness concerns with travel costs is high
enough (Condition 2 holds), and the probability of any given period having high
demand is low enough (Condition 3 holds), there is a unique equilibrium in which
the firm sets the same price during high and low demand (PH = PL ), with rationing
during high demand.
A key force behind this proposition is that the interaction of travel costs with
fairness concerns makes variable prices less profitable. Higher travel costs imply that
variable prices (as opposed to fixed prices) require a greater reduction in the lowdemand price to induce the same marginal customer to travel. Stronger fairness
concerns imply that this reduction in the low-demand price causes greater disutility
for customers who buy at a higher price during high demand. Therefore, when the
interaction of travel costs (c) with the fairness parameter (α) is large, as ensured by
Condition 2, the firm prefers fixed prices. The other conditions of this proposition
ensure that the capacity constraint binds during high demand, and that, conditional
on a policy of constant prices, the firm sets its price low enough that rationing occurs
during high demand.

3.2

Numerical Example

We now present a numerical example to help provide more intuition for the results
from the previous section.

Table 1 presents the parameter values used for the

numerical example.
11

The conditions of Proposition 3 are sufficient, but not necessary, for rationing to occur. Lemma
2 shows that Condition 2 ensures setting constant prices is optimal for the entire range of possible
values of v ∗ derived in Lemma 1, which may be a stronger condition than necessary for rationing.
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Fehr and Schmidt (1999) estimate that participants in their lab experiments have a
fairness concern parameter, α, ranging from 0 to 4. We initially perform our numerical
analysis for strong fairness concerns, with α = 4. We later repeat our analysis for
weaker fairness concerns.12
Table 1. Parameter values used in the numerical example
H = 0.14

Probability of high demand in a given period

DH = 25

Mass of customers in the market during high demand

DL = 8

Mass of customers in the market during low demand

K=3

Firm’s capacity constraint in each period

V = 10

Maximum valuation; customers valuations are uniform on [0, V ]

c=3

Cost of traveling to the venue

α=4

Strength of fairness concerns

Given these parameter values, Conditions 1, 2, and 3 hold. Lemma 1 states
that the optimal value of v ∗ lies in [6.5, 8.8]. Lemma 2 states that the firm’s optimal
strategy is to set constant prices, and Proposition 3 states that this profit-maximizing
price will involve rationing during high demand. We numerically compute that the
firm’s optimal price is PL = PH = 4.0, which results in customers traveling to the
venue if their valuation exceeds v ∗ = 7.6. During low demand, all purchase attempts
succeed; but during high demand, there is rationing and only 49.3% of purchase
attempts succeed. The firm sells 1.9 units during low demand and 3.0 units (full
capacity) during high demand, and its expected profits in each period are 8.3.
We compare this optimal strategy with two alternative strategies that do not
involve rationing. For constant prices with no rationing, the profit-maximizing price
12

As explained by Fehr and Schmidt (1999), a player with α = 4 would be willing to reduce his
own payoff by $1.00 in order to reduce the payoff of another player, who receives a larger payoff, by
$1.25, and thus reduce the payoff gap by $0.25.
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(for this type of policy) is PL = PH = 5.8, which results in expected profits in each
period of 7.2. For variable prices with no rationing, the profit-maximizing prices (for
this type of policy) are PL = 3.0 and PH = 4.1, which results in expected profits in
each period of 6.9.
Table 2. Outcomes for three price strategies
Constant prices
with rationing

Constant prices
with no rationing

Variable prices
with no rationing

Price PH

4.0

5.8

4.1

Price PL

4.0

5.8

3.0

Min. val. to travel v ∗

7.6

8.8

7.5

Fill rate SH

49.3%

100%

100%

Fill rate SL

100%

100%

100%

Quantity QH

3.0

3.0

3.0

Quantity QL

1.9

1.0

2.0

Expected profits E[πt ]
8.3
7.2
6.9
Note: Subscripts H and L denote variables for high- and low-demand periods.
Table 2 summarizes the outcomes for these three pricing strategies. For this
numerical example, the optimal policy with constant prices and rationing during
high demand leads to 14.4% higher profits (8.3 vs. 7.2) than the best possible policy
with constant prices and no rationing. The optimal policy with constant prices and
rationing also leads to 20.6% higher profits (8.3 vs. 6.9) than the best possible policy
with variable prices and no rationing.
We now repeat our numerical analysis for a larger range of parameter values.
Figure 1 presents the optimal price policy for values for the fairness parameter ranging
from α = 0 to α = 4, and values of the travel cost parameter ranging from c = 0
to c = 7. The other parameter values used in this figure are the same as for the
numerical example presented above.
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Figure 1. Optimal Price Strategy as a Function
of Fairness Concerns and Travel Costs

As noted in the discussion after Proposition 3, the interaction of fairness concerns
with travel costs causes the firm to prefer fixed prices rather than variable prices.
Consistent with this intuition, Figure 1 shows that the firm tends to prefer variable
pricing when either α or c is sufficiently low, but it prefers fixed pricing when both
parameters are large.
Figure 1 also shows that, when c > 4.7, the firm never rations the product.
Intuitively, as the sunk cost required to purchase the product increases, the firm
serves fewer customers in equilibrium. When this cost is sufficiently high, it is more
profitable to set constant prices such that the capacity constraint exactly binds during
high demand, so rationing is not required, rather than setting constant prices at a
lower level that would require rationing. Thus, rationing can occur for intermediate
values of travel costs, but not for extremely low or high values of this cost parameter.
19
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3.3

Model Extension: Reputation and Price Policy

This section relaxes the assumption that the firm’s price policy announcement is
binding, and we derive conditions in which reputation effects compel the firm not to
deviate from its announced policy.
We use the following timing assumptions. The firm first announces a non-binding
price policy that specifies PL and PH . As in the previous section, this price policy
announcement affects customers’ utility function, as they derive disutility from paying
a price higher than min(PL , PH ). Then in each period t:
1. Nature determines the demand state for the period, which the firm observes.
2. The firm decides its price for the period (which can differ from its announced
price policy). Customers do not observe the current demand state or price.
3. Customers who are in the market decide whether to incur the cost to travel to
the venue.
4. Customers who traveled learn the current price, and they have the option
to make a purchase attempt. If there is excess demand, then the product is
rationed. Payoffs for the period are realized.
A one-shot version of this game, without any price commitment, cannot have an
equilibrium with positive profits. Let v ∗ denote the minimum valuation of customers
who travel in such a potential equilibrium. To maximize profits, the firm would
then set its price greater than or equal to the willingness-to-pay of a customer with
valuation v ∗ ; however, such a price implies a customer with valuation equal to v ∗
did not have an incentive to incur the cost of travel. Therefore, the only possible
equilibrium of a one-shot version of this game involves no customers traveling, and
the firm setting its price at least as high as V − c, generating zero profits. We focus
20
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on an equilibrium of our repeated game in which players revert to the bad equilibrium
with zero profits if the firm ever deviates from its announced price policy, which
provides the strongest possible incentive for the firm not to deviate.13
A policy of constant prices with rationing during high demand gives the firm a
particularly strong incentive to deviate during high-demand periods. The firm can
announce such a policy, with constant relatively low prices, to induce customers with
fairness concerns to incur the cost of travel. However, once this policy announcement
convinces customers to travel, which helps increase sales during low-demand periods,
the firm could significantly increase its profits during a high-demand period by raising
its price until demand equals capacity. Such a deviation from its announced policy
would then cause the game to revert to the bad equilibrium with no profits in future
periods. We show that this threat of reduced future profits can sustain a policy of
constant prices with rationing during high demand if the following condition holds.
The left side of the inequality in this condition is an upper bound on the additional
profits a firm can generate by deviating from its price policy (from the equilibrium in
Proposition 3) during a high-demand period, and the right side is a lower bound on
the expected discounted value of its future profits if it maintains its optimal policy
with constant prices.
Condition 4. K

v ∗ −Pb
1+α



<

δ b
P
1−δ



V −v ∗
HK + (1 − H)DL V

where price Pb is defined as follows:
Pb ≡ v ∗ −

c
b + HS
b H (v ∗ )
1−H

13

(11)

For simplicity, we assume, when the period ends, all potential customers learn about any
deviation from the firm’s price policy. For example, customers might learn about deviations through
news stories or word of mouth. If only customers who traveled in the current period observed
deviations, then our conditions for sustaining a fixed price policy would need to be modified, but
results similar in spirit would still hold.
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As we would expect based on folk theorem results, this condition holds if the
discount factor δ is sufficiently close to one. However, for any δ > 0, this condition also
holds if customers have sufficiently strong fairness concerns, that is, if α is sufficiently
high. Fairness concerns reduce the firm’s temptation to deviate from its announced
price policy because customers with strong fairness concerns are not willing to pay
a large premium over the firm’s announced prices, even after they have incurred the
cost of travel. As shown in the section 3.1, strong fairness concerns along with positive
travel costs imply that the firm’s profit maximizing policy is to set constant prices;
furthermore, the results in the current section show that fairness concerns also help
the firm sustain such a policy of constant prices by reducing its incentive to deviate
from this policy in a repeated game.
Proposition 4. If the conditions for rationing in Proposition 3 hold, and the firm is
patient enough or customers have strong enough fairness concerns that Condition 4
holds, then the firm can sustain its profit-maximizing policy of constant prices with
rationing during high demand, even if its price policy announcement is not binding.
For the numerical example in section 3.2, Condition 4 holds for any α ≥ 1, c ≤ 4,
and δ ≥ 0.68. If this condition holds, the firm can sustain its optimal price policy,
based on the threat of loss of reputation and lost future profits if it ever deviates from
this policy.

3.4

Model Extension: Separate Search and Travel Costs

This section shows that our key findings still hold if search and travel decisions occur
sequentially, so customers can search before deciding whether to travel to the venue,
or they can travel directly to the venue without searching. We denote search costs
b 2 . The latter condition ensures that
by c1 and travel costs by c2 , where 0 ≤ c1 ≤ Hc
a customer who, in equilibrium, makes purchase attempts only during low demand
22
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prefers to search before traveling to avoid the expected cost of traveling during high
demand.
The timing for this model extension is as follows. The firm first announces a price
policy that specifies PL and PH , and in each period t:
1. Nature determines the demand state and the set of customers who are available
in the market. The firm automatically sets its price according to its announced
policy for the given demand state.14 Customers do not observe the current
demand state or price.
2. Customers who are in the market decide whether to incur the search cost c1 to
learn the price for the current period.
3. Customers who are in the market decide whether to incur the cost c2 to travel
to the location where the product is sold. Customers who incur this travel cost
learn the price even if they did not previously search.
4. Customers who traveled to the product location have the option to make a
purchase attempt. If there is excess demand, then the product is rationed.
Payoffs for the period are realized.
Under these timing assumptions, during periods with excess demand, customers must
travel to the venue to learn whether they are able to purchase and consume the
product in the current period. For example, customers who purchase electronic tickets
to Disneyland sometimes find they unable to enter the park on a given day, in which
case they must wait and use their tickets on a different day.15 In principle, we could
derive similar results using alternative timing assumptions, in which customers who
14

In this section, we assume the price policy announcement is binding, but in principle we could
allow for endogenous price commitment as in the previous section.
15
https://disneyland.disney.go.com/faq/tickets/eticket-terms-conditions/
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search online learn immediately whether they are able to consume the product on
their preferred day.16
If the firm sets fixed prices (PH = PL ), then searching for the current price provides
no information. In this case, customers follow the same strategy as in section 3.1.
There is no search, and each customer travels to the venue if the expected value of
doing so exceeds the cost of travel.17
On the other hand, if the firm uses a variable price policy (PH 6= PL ), there are
three possible strategies a customer with valuation vi could follow. For a customer
who does not make purchase attempts during any demand state, there is no reason
to search or travel, and this strategy results in zero utility.
b 2 , for a customer who makes purchase attempts only
Given the condition c1 ≤ Hc
during low demand, it is optimal to search first to avoid the expected cost of traveling
during high demand, and this strategy results in the following expected utility:


b SL (vi − PL ) − c2 − c1
(1 − H)

(12)

The customer prefers this strategy over the strategy of never purchasing if his
valuation vi is high enough that the above expression is positive.
Finally, for a customer who makes purchase attempts during both demand states,
it is optimal to travel directly to the venue without searching, as searching would
impose additional costs without affecting his travel decision. A necessary condition for
16

Under this alternative assumption, rationing could occur at the search stage as customers who
search learn whether they can purchase in the current period, or rationing could occur at the the
venue itself as customers with high valuations would travel directly to the venue without searching
if the success probability were sufficiently high.
17
If we assumed customers who search could observe both the price and the demand state, then in
some cases, customers might want to search even with a policy of constant prices, in order to avoid
travel during high-demand periods with rationing. However, this alternative assumption allowing
customers who search to learn the demand state would not affect our results. All customers who
travel in the fixed-price equilibrium derived in this section gain greater expected utility from traveling
directly to the venue than they would from searching and traveling only when demand is low.
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this strategy to be optimal is the customer’s valuation must exceed the price during
both demand states, which implies this strategy results in the following expected
utility:18



b
b L (vi − PL ) − c2
HSH vi − PH − α(PH − PL ) + (1 − H)S

(13)

By comparing (13) with (12), we find that a customer would prefer to travel
directly to the venue and purchase during both demand states rather than searching
and purchasing only during low demand if his valuation is high enough that the
following expression is positive:


b SH (vi − PH − α(PH − PL )) − c2 + c1
H

(14)

Based on the preceding analysis, for any given prices and success probabilities, we
can compute cutoff values v1∗ and v2∗ , where c2 ≤ v1∗ ≤ v2∗ ≤ V , such that customers
with valuations less than v1∗ never purchase, those with valuations between v1∗ and v2∗
search and travel to the venue only during low demand, and those with valuations
greater than v2∗ travel directly to the venue and always make purchase attempts.
Because the low-demand success probability SL is a weakly increasing continuous
function of v1∗ , and the high-demand success probability SH is a weakly increasing
continuous function of v2∗ , for any given price policy, we can compute values of v1∗
and v2∗ such that customers’ search and travel behavior are optimal given the prices
and success probabilities. In some cases, v1∗ = v2∗ . For example, if prices and success
probabilities for purchase attempts have sufficiently little variation across demand
states, then a customer would either never purchase or always travel directly to the
18

As in the previous sections, these derivations focus on policies for which PL ≤ PH , which is true
in equilibrium.
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venue, and no customers would search.19
Similar to the analysis of the main version of the model in section 3.1, for
this model extension we now derive sufficient conditions for rationing to occur in
equilibrium. The first condition is that capacity satisfies:
Condition 5.

DL (V −c2 )
2V

<K<

DH (V −c2 )
2V

We show the above condition ensures, in equilibrium, the minimum valuation of
customers who purchase during low demand, v1∗ , lies in the interval [v ∗1 , v ∗1 ], defined
as follows:

v ∗1 =

v ∗1

V + c2
2



K
=V 1−
DH

(15)

(16)

We next show that constant prices generate greater profits than variable profits
b 2 and
for any value of v1∗ in the interval specified above, if c1 is sufficiently close to Hc
the following condition also holds.
Condition 6. v ∗1 − v ∗1 <

αc2
b
1−H

Finally, given constant prices, we show the firm serves customers with valuations
strictly below v ∗1 during both demand states, which requires rationing during high
demand, if the following condition holds.


2K
HKV
Condition 7. V 1 − D
> 1−c2Hb + (1−H)D
H
L
Therefore, if all of these conditions hold, the firm sets constant prices with
rationing during high demand.
19

Formally, by deriving the minimum values of vi that make (12) and (14) positive, we find there
b + c2 )]/SL < PH + α(PH − PL ) +
is a segment of customers who search only if PL + [c1 /(1 − H)
b + c2 )]/SH , in which case there is a range of valuations for which (12) is positive but (14) is
[−c1 /H
negative.
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Proposition 5. In the model extension with separate search and travel costs, if
b 2 , there is a unique
Conditions 5, 6, and 7 hold, and c1 is sufficiently close to Hc
equilibrium in which the firm sets the same price during high and low demand
(PH = PL ), with rationing during high demand.
For notational simplicity, we have stated this proposition for the case in which
b 2 . The proof of Proposition 5 in the appendix derives more general conditions
c1 → Hc
b 2 and we do not impose c1 → Hc
b 2 , then in place of
for rationing. If c1 < Hc
Condition 6, we require that the profits from fixed prices in equation (41) are greater
than the profits from variable prices in equation (39) in the appendix.20 On the other
b 2 , then customers never search, and this model extension is equivalent
hand, if c1 > Hc
to the main version of the model in section 3.1.
The intuition for Proposition 5 is similar to the intuition for Proposition 3. If
fairness concerns are strong enough, and search costs and travel costs are both large
enough, then the firm maintains low prices with rationing during high demand to
encourage customers to travel to the venue during low demand. The main difference is
Proposition 5 requires that search costs (c1 ) cannot be too low relative to a customer
in the market’s perceived probability of high demand based on rational Bayesian
b times travel costs (c2 ). Intuitively, if search costs are much lower than
updating (H)
travel costs, then setting constant prices to encourage people to travel directly to the
venue is not an efficient way to increase purchases during low demand. In such cases,
it would be more profitable to use variable pricing and allow customers to search to
discover the demand state.
20
For a given value of v1∗ , a reduction in search costs (c1 ) has three effects on the profits from a
variable price policy. First, reduced search costs allow the firm to increase PL while still attracting
the same customers during low demand. Second, given fairness concerns, the resulting increase in
PL implies, all else equal, the firm can increase PH while still providing the same amount of utility to
customers during high demand. However, the third effect, which tends to offset the second, is that
reduced search costs imply the firm must provide greater utility to customers during high demand
to induce them to travel to the venue and purchase during both periods rather than searching and
purchasing only during low demand. The conditions for rationing must account for all three effects
when comparing the profits from variable versus fixed price policies.
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As was the case for Proposition 3, the conditions of Proposition 5 are sufficient
but not necessary for rationing to occur in equilibrium. In fact, we show that strictly
positive fairness concerns, search costs, and travel costs are all necessary conditions
for rationing.
Proposition 6. In the model extension with separate search and travel costs, if
customers do not have fairness concerns (α = 0), there is no rationing in equilibrium.
Proposition 7. In the model extension with separate search and travel costs, if either
search costs are zero (c1 = 0) or travel costs are zero (c2 = 0), there is no rationing
in equilibrium.
The intuition for these results is similar to the intuition for Propositions 1 and 2.
If customers do not have fairness concerns, then setting PH low enough to generate
shortages is not an efficient way to induce customers to travel to the venue; and if
search costs or travel costs are zero, then the firm can raise PH until no rationing is
necessary during high-demand periods without affecting its profits during low-demand
periods.
Finally, we show that, if the firm can reduce search costs, making it easier for
customers to find current price information, then doing so increases equilibrium
profits.21
Proposition 8. In the model extension with separate search and travel costs, a
reduction in search costs (c1 ) weakly increases the firm’s equilibrium profits.
Intuitively, low search costs make it easy for customers with low valuations to avoid
travel when prices are high. Therefore, a reduction in search costs allows the firm
to use variable pricing, with price increases during peak demand, without causing a
significant reduction in sales during low-demand periods.
21

In the parameter range for which the firm sets variable prices, a marginal reduction in search
costs leads to strictly higher profits. In the parameter range for which the firm sets fixed prices, a
marginal reduction in search costs has no effect on profits.
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4

Conclusion

This paper studies an important problem in markets where a firm has a capacity
constraint and customers have fairness concerns. We show the firm may want to
set constant prices to avoid imposing disutility from unfairness on customers, who
would have to incur travel costs to learn the current price under a variable price
policy. However, if the firm can communicate each period’s price to customers before
they incur travel costs, so that customers have the option not to travel during high
demand, then the firm does use variable pricing.
Kahneman et al. (1986) claim that price variation based on demand fluctuations
antagonizes customers, which can cause firms to set stable prices and experience
shortages during peak demand. We predict that fairness concerns cause shortages only
if customers face uncertainty about each period’s demand level, which the firm cannot
resolve, either because the firm itself faces fundamental uncertainty in forecasting
demand, or because it does not have a low-cost way of communicating these forecasts
to its customers.
Future research could extend our model to explore other ways firms can manage
demand spikes. For example, an exogenous capacity constraint, as in our model,
is a reasonably accurate assumption for many entertainment firms. Disneyland has
limited room to expand because of its location in the city of Anaheim (Vaux 2010).
Similarly, the Boston Red Sox baseball team cannot, from a structural engineering
perspective, add many new seats to their current stadium; they would need to build
an entirely new stadium to increase their seating capacity (Charlotin 2010). However,
some firms can expand capacity quickly. When ridesharing services such as Uber and
Lyft increase prices during peak demand, it encourages more drivers to become active
during peak demand (Kosoff 2015). Future research could incorporate endogenous
capacity into our model to allow for this additional benefit of increased prices.
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Future research could also explore different rationing rules. For example, a firm
could potentially use observable customer characteristics, such as location of residence, to decide which customers are able to purchase during high-demand periods.
Such customers will have greater willingness to incur the cost of travel if they are
confident their purchase attempts will be successful.
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Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1 For any price policy that leads to rationing, we will show
that, if α = 0, there is a profitable deviation, which implies that such a price policy
cannot be optimal.
Suppose rationing occurs only during high demand. If PH < v ∗ < PL , then the
marginal customer with valuation v ∗ buys only during high demand. In this case, a
small increase in PH increases high-demand profits (PH K), without causing any sales
reduction during low demand, despite the resulting marginal increase in v ∗ . Similarly,
if PL < v ∗ ≤ PH , then the marginal customer with valuation v ∗ buys only during low
demand. In this case, a small increase in PH increases high-demand profits, without
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causing any sales reduction during low demand, because this price change does not
affect v ∗ . In both cases, a small increase in PH leads to greater total profits.
The only way a marginal increase in PH can reduce sales during low demand is if
PH < v ∗ and PL ≤ v ∗ , in which case such a price increase leads to a higher value of
v ∗ and reduces low-demand sales. When v ∗ is weakly greater than the price for both
demand states, prices must satisfy equation (5) as follows:

b H (v ∗ )(v ∗ − PH ) + (1 − H)(v
b ∗ − PL ) = c
HS

(17)

Suppose the firm increases PH by  = v ∗ − PH . In order to induce customers with the
H (v
same v ∗ to continue traveling, it must decrease PL by  HS1−
b
H

b

∗)

so that (17) continues

to hold. The net effect on expected profits of these price changes is:
 b



HSH (v ∗ )
V − v∗
HK + 
(1 − H)DL
b
V
1−H
b =
Inserting H

HDH
,
HDH +(1−H)DL

b =
(1 − H)

(1−H)DL
,
HDH +(1−H)DL

and SH (v ∗ ) =

(18)

KV
DH (V −v ∗ )

into

this expression, we find that the net effect on expected profits is zero. Because we
increased PH by , where  = v ∗ − PH , we now have PL < v ∗ = PH . As shown above,
further increases in PH increase profits during high demand without affecting sales
during low demand. Therefore, the initial price policy with rationing only during
high demand could not be optimal.
Similar analysis shows that a price policy with rationing only during low demand
cannot be optimal. Finally, if rationing occurs during both demand states, then the
firm always sells K units, and a small price increase leads to greater profits. Thus, if
α = 0, the firm’s profit-maximizing price policy cannot involve rationing. QED
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Proof of Proposition 2 If c = 0, then all customers always travel. Suppose a price
policy leads to rationing during high demand. Increasing PH leads to greater profits
during high demand without affecting travel behavior. If PH ≥ PL , this increase
in PH does not affect sales during low demand. On the other hand, if PH < PL
this increase in PH leads to weakly greater sales during low demand by reducing the
effect of fairness concerns on low-demand sales. In either case, total expected profits
increase. Therefore, rationing during high demand cannot be optimal. A similar
argument shows that rationing during low demand cannot be optimal. QED

Proof of Lemma 1 We first show that any price strategy that leads to a minimum
travel valuation of v ∗ > v ∗ cannot be the firm’s profit-maximizing strategy. The
upper bound v ∗ was defined such that the firm always has excess capacity if v ∗ > v ∗ ,
so all purchase attempts succeed, and the equation (5) becomes:

b max[v ∗ − PH − α(PH − PL ), 0] + (1 − H)
b max[v ∗ − PL , 0] = c
H

(19)

We will show that, for any v ∗ > v ∗ , the most profitable way to induce customers
with valuation v ∗ to travel is by setting constant prices, PL = PH = v ∗ − c. Suppose
the firm starts with these constant prices. Now suppose the firm increases PH by
a small amount . If customers have no fairness concerns, so α = 0, then in order
for customers with the same valuation v ∗ to continue traveling, the firm must reduce
PL by  (1−HH)
b so that equation (19) continues to hold. Therefore, the net effect on
b

∗

∗

V −v
expected profits of these price changes is HDH V −v
−  (1−HH)
b (1 − H)DL V . Note
V

that

b
H
b
(1−H)

=

HDH
.
(1−H)DL

b

Therefore, for α = 0 and a given value of v ∗ , the net effect on
∗

expected profits of this deviation from constant prices is HDH V −v
[ − ] = 0, so the
V
firm is indifferent between constant prices and small deviations from constant prices.
On the other hand, if α > 0, increasing PH by  requires the firm to make an even
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larger reduction in PL in order for (19) to continue to hold for the same v ∗ , so that
the net effect on expected profits is strictly negative. Similar derivation show that,
starting with constant prices and a given value of v ∗ , the firm would not want to
increase PL and reduce PH to induce the same value of v ∗ .
We also need to check non-local deviations. If the firm sets PH high enough that
PH + α(PH − PL ) > v ∗ , then customers with valuation v ∗ no longer purchase during
high demand, even if PL decreases enough that these customers continue to travel
and purchase during low demand. The firm’s profits during each high demand period
become

DH PH [V −PH −α(PH −PL )]
.
V

to PH , we have

Taking the first derivative of these profits with respect

DH [V −2PH −α(2PH −PL )]
.
V

Under Condition 1, this derivative is negative

for PH > v ∗ , so the firm could increase its profits by reducing its price. Therefore,
this non-local deviation from constant prices is not optimal. Similar analysis shows
that a large (non-local) increase PL cannot be optimal, and therefore constant prices
are the profit-maximizing way to induce customer travel for any v ∗ > v ∗ .
With constant prices, the firm’s expected profits as a function of v ∗ are:


V − v∗
E[πt ] = [HDH + (1 − H)DL ](v − c)
V
∗

(20)

Taking the first derivative, we have:


dE[πt ]
V + c − 2v ∗
= [HDH + (1 − H)DL ]
dv ∗
V
Condition 1 guarantees v ∗ >

V +c
.
2

(21)

Therefore, this derivative is negative for any

v ∗ > v ∗ , and prices that lead to any such v ∗ cannot be optimal because the firm could
increase its profits by reducing its prices.
We next show that any price strategy that leads to a minimum travel valuation of
v ∗ < v ∗ cannot be the firm’s profit-maximizing strategy. For any such v ∗ , we will show
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that the firm could increase its profits by raising prices during one or both demand
states. We need to consider three cases.
First, suppose the firm sets a price policy with PL < PH , and v ∗ is such that
PL < v ∗ < PH + α(PH − PL ). In this case, customers with valuation v ∗ makes
purchase attempts only during low demand periods. If the firm has excess demand
even during low-demand periods, then profits during low demand are PL K. In this
case, a small increase in PL leads to greater profits during low demand. On the other
hand, if the firm can satisfy all customers during low demand, then its profits during
∗

low demand are PL DL V −v
, where price PL must satisfy equation (5):
V
b ∗ − PL ) = c
(1 − H)(v
Solving for price, we have PL = v ∗ −

c
b,
1−H

(22)

which implies profits during low demand

periods are:

πL =


V − v∗
v −
DL
b
V
1−H
∗

c

(23)

Taking the first derivative, we have:
V +
dπL
= DL
dv ∗

c
b
1−H

− 2v ∗ 

V

(24)

This derivative is positive for all v ∗ < v ∗ . Therefore, increasing PL would increase
profits during low demand, and would also weakly increase profits during high demand
by reducing the effect of fairness concerns on high-demand profits.
Next, suppose the firm sets a price policy with PH < PL , and v ∗ is such that
PH < v ∗ < PL + α(PL − PH ). Given v ∗ < v ∗ , the firm has excess demand during high
demand periods, during which it generates profits PH K. A similar argument to the
one above shows that increasing PH leads to greater profits.
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Finally, suppose the firm sets a price policy such that PL < v ∗ and PH < v ∗ , so that
customers with valuation v ∗ purchase during both demand states. A similar argument
to the one described above (for v ∗ > v ∗ ) shows that constant prices (PH = PL )
are the optimal way to induce such an outcome. In particular, for α = 0 and a
given value of v ∗ , if the firm starts with constant prices and increases PH by , it
H (v
must decrease PL by  HS1−
b
H

b

∗)

to induce customers with the same v ∗ to continue

traveling. This deviation leads to zero effect on expected profits (see the proof of
Proposition 1 for additional detail). However, if α > 0, the firm must make an even
larger reduction in PL to maintain the same v ∗ , which leads to strictly lower expected
profits. Therefore, constant prices are optimal for any policy in which customers with
valuation v ∗ purchase during both demand states.
Given PH = PL = P and v ∗ < v ∗ , if the firm has excess demand during both
demand states, then a small price increase leads to greater profits. On the other
hand, if the firm has excess demand during high demand periods but not during low
demand, then prices must satisfy (5) as follows:

b H (v ∗ )(v ∗ − P ) + (1 − H)(v
b ∗ − P) = c
HS
Solving for price, we have P = v ∗ −

E[πt ] = v ∗ −

b =
Inserting (1 − H)

c
b HS
b H (v ∗ ) ,
1−H+

c
b
b H (v ∗ )
1 − H + HS

(1−H)DL
,
(1−H)DL +HDH

b =
H

(25)

which implies expected profits are:




V − v∗
HK + (1 − H)DL
V

HDH
,
(1−H)DL +HDH

and SH (v ∗ ) =

KV
DH (V −v ∗ )

(26)

into

the above equation, we have:

∗



E[πt ] = v HK + (1 − H)DL



V − v∗
V




V − v∗
−c
[(1 − H)DL + HDH ] (27)
V
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Rearranging terms, we have:


∗

E[πt ] = HKv + (1 − H)DL

V − v∗
V


v∗ −

c



b
1−H

(28)

Taking the first derivative, we have:
V +
dE[πt ]
= HK + (1 − H)DL
dv ∗

c
b
1−H

− 2v ∗ 

V

(29)

This derivative is positive for all v ∗ < v ∗ . Therefore, increasing prices would increase
profits. We have shown that, for any v ∗ < v ∗ , the firm can always increase profits by
raising its price during one or both demand states, so any such v ∗ cannot be optimal
for the firm. QED

Proof of Lemma 2 Lemma 1 shows that, under Condition 1, the minimum
valuation of customers who travel is given by v ∗ ∈ [v ∗ , v ∗ ]. For all v ∗ in this range,
Condition 1 ensures the firm has sufficient capacity to serve all customers who travel
during low demand, but not during high demand. We will show that Condition 2
ensures setting constant prices is the profit-maximizing way to induce customers to
travel for any v ∗ in this range. We consider three cases. For all three cases, some of
the derivations from the proof of Lemma 1 still apply.
First, suppose the firm sets a price policy with PH < PL , and v ∗ is such that
PH < v ∗ < PL + α(PL − PH ). During high demand, the firm generates profits PH K.
The same argument as in the proof of Lemma 1 shows that increasing PH leads to
greater profits. Therefore, any such price policy cannot be profit-maximizing, and
the profit-maximizing policy must involve one of the following two cases.
Next, suppose the firm sets a price policy with PL < PH , and v ∗ is such that
PL < v ∗ < PH + α(PH − PL ). The same derivations as in the proof of Lemma 1
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show that, for this type of price policy, the price during low demand must satisfy
PL = v ∗ −

c
b.
1−H

We still need to compute the optimal price during high demand. If

PH + α(PH − PL ) ≤ v ∗ , the firm is at capacity and generates profits PH K during high
demand, so profits increase as the price increases in this range. However, the same
derivations as in the proof of Lemma 1 show the firm would not want to set prices high
enough to have excess capacity during high demand. Therefore, the profit-maximizing
price is such that capacity constraint holds with equality, with PH =

v ∗ +αPL
.
1+α

These

prices imply that the firm’s expected profits are:
 v ∗ + αv ∗ −
E[πt ] = HK

αc
b
1−H



1+α


+ (1 − H)DL

V − v∗
V



c

∗

v −

b
1−H


(30)

Finally, suppose the firm sets a price policy such that PL < v ∗ and PH < v ∗ , so
that customers with valuation v ∗ purchase during both demand states. The same
derivations as in the proof of Lemma 1 shows that, for any such policy, it is optimal
to set constant prices, with PH = PL = v ∗ −

c
b HS
b H (v ∗ ) ,
1−H+

and the expected profits

from this outcome are:


∗

E[πt ] = HKv + (1 − H)DL

V − v∗
V


v∗ −



c
b
1−H

(31)

Therefore, the policy with constant prices generates greater profits than the policy
with variable prices if the following condition holds:

∗

v >

v ∗ + αv ∗ −

αc
b
1−H

(32)

1+α

Rearranging terms, this condition is equivalent to v ∗ − v ∗ <

αc
b.
1−H

Condition 2 ensures

this inequality holds for all v ∗ ∈ [v ∗ , v ∗ ]. QED
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Proof of Proposition 3 Lemmas 1 and 2 show that, if Conditions 1 and 2 hold,
then the minimum valuation of customers who travel is given by v ∗ ∈ [v ∗ , v ∗ ], and the
firm sets constant prices. We will show that Condition 3 ensures the firm sets prices
low enough that customers with valuations strictly below v ∗ travel, and rationing
occurs in equilibrium. In particular, we need to show that the derivative of profits
with respect to v ∗ is negative for v ∗ = v ∗ .
When the firm sets constant prices to induce travel for any v ∗ ∈ [v ∗ , v ∗ ], the
derivative of profits with respect to v ∗ are given by (29). Taking this derivative


K
∗
at v = V 1 − DH , we have:

dE[πt ]
= HK + (1 − H)DL
dv ∗

V +

c
b
1−H


− 2V 1 −

K
DH

!

V

(33)

This derivative is negative if the following inequality holds:


K
− 2V 1 −
V +
b
DH
1−H
c


<

−HKV
(1 − H)DL

(34)

Rearringing term, this inequality is equivalent to the following:


HKV
2K
+
<V 1−
b
(1 − H)DL
DH
1−H
c

(35)

This inequality is the same as Condition 3. Thus, the conditions of this proposition
ensure the firm sets constant prices that lead to customer travel for a value of v ∗
strictly less than v ∗ , which leads to rationing during high demand.
Because the derivative of (29) with respect to v ∗ is strictly negative, the second
derivative of the profit function is strictly negative, and the equilibrium is unique.
QED
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Proof of Proposition 4 The proofs of Lemma 1 and Proposition 3 shows that,
under the conditions of the proposition, the minimum valuation of customers who
travel is v ∗ ∈ [v ∗ , v ∗ ], prices are PL = PH = P ≡ v ∗ −

c
b HS
b H (v ∗ ) ,
1−H+

and expected

profits are given by (26).
This outcome leads to rationing during high demand. During a high-demand
period, the firm could deviate to a higher price Pe =

v ∗ +αP
,
1+α

so that the capacity

constraint binds with equality and there is no rationing. This price deviation would
∗ −P 
K.
increase profits for the period by (Pe − P )K = v1+α
By setting v ∗ = v ∗ , the left side of Condition 4 is an upper bound on the profits
from deviating, and the right side of Condition 4 is a lower bound on the expected
discounted value of future profits if the firm maintains its optimal policy with constant
prices. Therefore, if this condition holds, the optimal strategy with constant prices
and rationing is sustainable. QED

Proof of Proposition 5 The same derivations as in the proof of Lemma 1,
with slight modifications to account for separate search and travel costs, show that
Condition 5 guarantees it cannot be optimal to set prices such that v1∗ > v ∗1 . For any
such prices, the firm would have excess capacity during both periods, and reducing
one or both prices would lead to greater profits. Derivations similar to those for
Lemma 1 also show it cannot be optimal to set prices such that v1∗ < v ∗1 , as the firm
could increase profits by increasing one or both prices.
We now show that, for any v1∗ ∈ [v ∗1 , v ∗1 ], Condition 6 guarantees the optimal way
to induce customers with valuation greater than v1∗ to purchase is by setting constant
prices rather than variable prices. Under variable pricing, to induce customers with
valuation v1∗ to search and then travel during low demand, the firm must set PL =
v1∗ − c2 −

c1
b.
1−H

We then compute the maximum high-demand price that induces

customers with valuation v ∗1 to travel directly to the venue, so the firm is exactly at
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capacity during high demand. We find this value of PH by setting expression (14)
equal to zero and inserting vi = v ∗1 and SH = 1:


∗
b
H v 1 − PH − α(PH − PL ) − c2 + c1 = 0

(36)

Rearranging terms, we derive the following price during high demand:

PH =

v ∗1 − c2 +

c1
b
H

+ αPL

(37)

1+α

Therefore, given these prices, the firm’s expected profits under variable pricing are:

E[πt ] = HK

 v∗ − c +
2
1

c1
b
H

αc1
b
1−H

+ αv1∗ − αc2 −
1+α




+(1−H)DL

V − v1∗
V



v1∗ −c2 −

c1
b
1−H
(38)

Rearranging terms, the profits from variable pricing are equal to:
 v ∗ + αv ∗ −
1

E[πt ] = HK

αc2
b
1−H

−

b 2 −c1
Hc
b
H

+

b 2 −c1 ) 
α(Hc
b
1−H

(39)

1+α


+(1 − H)DL

V − v1∗
V



v1∗

b 2 − c1 
Hc
+
−
b
b
1−H
1−H
c2

b 2 , the profits from variable pricing converge to the following value, which
As c1 → Hc
is analogous to the expression for profits from variable pricing in Lemma 2.
 v ∗ + αv ∗ −
E[πt ] = HK

1

1

αc2
b
1−H



1+α


+ (1 − H)DL

V − v1∗
V



v1∗

−

c2
b
1−H


(40)

For a given value of v1∗ , we now compute the profits from fixed prices. The same
derivations as in the proof of Lemma 2 show that, if the firm sets constant prices,
with PH = PL = v1∗ −

c2
b HS
b H (v ∗ ) ,
1−H+
1

then expression (13) is positive for vi > v1∗ , so

customers with valuations greater than v1∗ derive positive utility from traveling to the
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venue. The firm then generates the following expected profits:

E[πt ] =

HKv1∗


+ (1 − H)DL

V − v1∗
V


v1∗ −

c2



b
1−H

(41)

The general condition in which fixed prices generate greater profits than variable
prices for all v1∗ ∈ [v ∗1 , v ∗1 ] is that the profits in (41) are greater than in (39) for v1∗ = v ∗1 .
b 2 , we need that the profits in (41) are greater than in (40), and the same
As c1 → Hc
analysis as in Lemma 2 shows that this inequality holds under Condition 6.
Finally, the same derivations as in the proof of Proposition 3 show that, under
Condition 7, if the firm sets constant prices and customers travel directly to the venue,
then it is optimal to set prices such that v1∗ = v2∗ < v ∗1 , which implies there is rationing
during high demand. As in the proof of Proposition 3, the second derivative of profits
with respect to v1∗ is strictly negative, which ensures the equilibrium is unique. QED
Proof of Proposition 6 Suppose a price policy leads to rationing during high
demand and v1∗ < v2∗ , so the marginal customer during low demand periods does not
purchase during high demand. In this case, a small increase in PH increases profits
during high demand and does not affect profits during low demand.
On the other hand, suppose there is rationing during high demand and v1∗ = v2∗ , so
the marginal customer during low demand also purchases during high demand. Given
α = 0, the same argument as in the proof of Proposition 1 shows the firm can increase
profits by increasing PH while reducing PL in a way that holds profits constant while
keeping the same marginal customer, and then by increasing PH further after prices
reach the point at which this marginal customer purchases only during low demand.
In both cases, there is a profitable deviation.
Similar analysis shows that a price policy with rationing only during low demand
or both demand states cannot be optimal. QED
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Proof of Proposition 7 If travel costs are zero (c2 = 0), this model extension is
equivalent to the original version of the model with no search costs, and Proposition 2
ensures there is no rationing.
If search costs are zero (c1 = 0), then customers can learn the current price at no
cost. Therefore, the optimal strategy for a customer with valuation vi is to travel to
the venue during low-demand periods if and only if the following condition holds:


SL vi − PL − max[α(PL − PH ), 0] > c2

(42)

Similarly, the customer will travel to the venue during high demand if an only if:


SH vi − PH − max[α(PH − PL ), 0] > c2

(43)

Suppose a price policy leads to rationing during high demand. A small increase in
PH leads to greater profits during high demand, and it either has no effect on profits
during low demand (if PH ≥ PL ) or it weakly increases profits during low demand (if
PH < PL ). In either case, total expected profits increase. Therefore, rationing during
high demand cannot be optimal. A similar argument shows that rationing during low
demand cannot be optimal. QED

Proof of Proposition 8 We first present the proof for the case in which Condition 5
holds. In this case, if the firm sets fixed prices, profits for a given v1∗ are stated by
(41), which does not depend on c1 .
If the firm sets variable prices, profits for a given v1∗ are stated by (39). Taking
the derivative with respect to c1 , we have:
∂E[πt ]
= HK
∂c1



1
b
H

−

α
b
1−H

1+α




− (1 − H)DL

V − v1∗
V





1
b
1−H

For any α ≥ 0, the first expression in parentheses is weakly less than
45

1
b,
H

(44)

which implies:
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1
1
∂E[πt ]
V − v1∗
≤ HK
− (1 − H)DL
b
b
∂c1
V
1−H
H

(45)

Because Condition 5 ensures the capacity constraint binds during high demand, we
have K < DH (

V −v1∗
),
V

which implies:

∂E[πt ]
<
∂c1



V − v1∗
V



HDH
(1 − H)DL
−
b
b
1−H
H


(46)

b from (1) shows the right side of this inequality equals
Inserting the expression for H
zero. Therefore, the derivative of profits with respect to c1 is negative, which implies
that a decrease in search costs leads to strictly greater profits under variable pricing.
The preceding analysis applies if Condition 5 holds, in which case the capacity
constraint binds during high demand but not during low demand. If the capacity
constraint does not bind during either demand state, the firm can implement the
solution from a standard monopoly pricing problem with linear demand curves by
setting PH = PL =

V −c2
,
2

and c1 has no effect on equilibrium profits.

We now address the case in which the capacity constraint binds during both
demand states. If the firm sets constant prices, then a reduction in c1 has no effect on
profits. If the firm sets variable prices, then the capacity constraint must bind with
equality in each demand state, or the firm could increase profits by raising one or both
prices. Following a reduction in c1 by a small amount , the firm can continue to sell
at capacity during both demand states by increasing PL by


b
1−H

so that (12) is still


b
H

so that (14) is also

positive for the same set of customers, and decreasing PH by

H
positive for at least the same customers. The net effect on profits is K( 1−H
b −H
b ), and
1−H

b from (1) shows this profit change is strictly positive.
inserting the expression for H
We have shown that, for any equilibrium value of v1∗ , a reduction in search costs
implies the firm can generate the same or greater profits. QED
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